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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent.

:

v.

:

LOUIE EDWIN SIMSf

:

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT
Case No. 870276 CA

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The failure of the State to respond to the issue of the
propriety of the roadblock constitutes a waiver or abandonment of
that issue.

This court must find that the roadblock violated

both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

A consent

following an illegal detention is insufficient in and of itself
to make evidence seized as a result of that detention admissible.
Under both of those constitutional provisions courts are required
to make a finding that any consent is sufficiently attenuated
from

an

illegal

detention.

detention

to dissipate

the

taint

from that

Any consent given in this case fails to meet this

attenuation requirement.

The search of the trunk of appellant's

vehicle cannot be justified under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah.
- 2 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE OF
THE PROPRIETY OF THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF APPELLANT'S
VEHICLE REQUIRES THIS COURT TO FIND THAT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION DID OCCUR.
Respondent

chose

not

to

brief

the

issue

raised

by

appellant relative to the constitutionality of the roadblock stop
of

appellant's

vehicle.

Rather

than

addressing

the

issue,

respondent asserts that the question of the detention is rendered
moot

by

appellant's

failure

to

raise

voluntariness of the consent search.

the

issue

of

the

However, as shown in Point

II r infra, the voluntariness of the consent is only a threshold
issue in determining the admissibility of evidence seized as a
result of the unlawful detention.

This court is further required

to determine if the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal

detention

to

vitiate

the

taint

of

that

detention.

Appellant did request in his opening brief that this court order
the fruits of the roadblock stop suppressed.

One of the fruits of

that detention was the purported voluntary consent.
For a court to reach the question of the fruits of an
illegal detention there must first be a finding that there was an
illegal detention.

Respondent has made an affirmative decision

not

issue

to brief

that

in this

case.

Generally,

when an

appellant fails to brief an issue, that particular issue is deemed

- 3 -

to have been waived or abandoned.

State v. McCall, 677 P.2d 920,

139 Ariz. 147, cert, den. 467 U.S. 1220 (1984); State v. Puckett,
634 P.2d 144, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, aff'd 640 P.2d 1198, 230 Kan.
596 (1981).

The respondent chose not to address to the roadblock

issue or brief it in any manner.

Consequently, the state has

waived or abandoned any argument on that issue.

Therefore, this

court should find that the roadblock in question violated both
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Since the State has

conceded the primary illegality of the detention, the next issue
to

determine

is

the

admissibility

of

the

fruits

of

that

detention.

POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE
UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND ANY CONSENT TO VITIATE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE DETENTION.
Respondent contends that because appellant did not raise
the

issue of

the voluntariness of any consent to search the

vehicle, the evidence discovered as a result of the search of
appellant's vehicle is admissible.

See Point II, infra.
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Appellant requested that the

fruits

of

the

unlawful

roadblock

stop

be

suppressed.

The

analysis suggested by respondent is insufficient to protect the
Fourth Amendment interests at issue.

Likewise, an analysis that

looks only to the voluntariness of the consent is insufficient to
meet the requirements of Article If Section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah.
A.
The Fourth Amendment Requires A Finding
Of Both A Voluntary Consent And An
Attenuation Of That Consent From The
Initial Illegal Stop.
In support of the argument that a voluntary consent, in
and of itself, vitiates the taint of a prior unlawful detention,
respondent relies upon State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App.)
cert, granted
in Arroyo.

P.2d

specific

That is, in fact, the holding

However, that holding is of questionable legal merit

for several reasons.
Supreme

(1989).

The first, and most obvious, is that the

Court of Utah has granted
holding.

certiorari

to review that

Second, the court in Arroyo misinterpreted the

rulings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit which it used as authority for this conclusion.

Third,

2
See:

Opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 20, 38.

3
This court reached similar conclusions in State v. Sierray 754
P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988); and State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Ut.
App. 1988).
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the holding in Arroyo provides insufficient protection of Fourth
Amendment

interests.

Finally,

the

ruling

in

Arroyo

is

inconsistent with the rulings of the majority of courts that have
addressed this same issue.

Consequently, this court should

overrule its holding in the Sierra-Arroyo-Aquilar line of cases to
the extent that it must also be shown that there is sufficient
attenuation between the initial illegal stop and the purported
consent to make the questioned evidence admissable.
The

authority

for

the

holding

in Sierra

and Arroyo,

relative to the consent issue, is the case of United States v.
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.) cert, den. 107 S.Ct. 315 (1986).
That is a case that has been criticized by the commentators. 4 The
interpretation given to Carson in Sierra, Arroyo and Aquilar is
overbroad in light of both the ruling in Carson and other rulings
on this same issue from the Tenth Circuit.
United States v. Carson, supra, involved a dove hunting
violation.

A deputy

sheriff

observed

the defendant

hunting.

Without the defendant's knowledge, the sheriff inspected a large
pail belonging to the defendant.

The pail contained a number of

dead doves.

The trial court found that this search was illegal.

The

then

sheriff

left

the

area

and

contacted

a

state

game

LeFave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. §8.2(d) (1990) pocket part),
fn. 88.1; Note, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches
and Tainted Fruit, 87 Columbia 842 (1987).

- fi -

protection
requested

officer.
to

search

The

two

returned

the defendant's

consented to the search.

some

vehicle.

time
The

later

and

defendant

The same pail was searched and it was

found that the defendant had exceeded the hunting limit.

He was

charged and convicted of that offense.
On appeal, the defendant in Carson claimed that the second
search was the fruit of the first illegal search.

The court

rejected the defendant's argument and held that the consent given
under the circumstances of that case made the evidence admissible.
The court first considered Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471
(1963)f and ruled that the Supreme Court had rejected a purely
causal or "but for" analysis in applying the exclusionary rule.
Rather, the Court required that two alternatives be considered in
order to determine the admissibility of evidence seized subsequent
to an illegal search.

First, if the evidence was obtained by

means that were free of police exploitation of the prior unlawful
conduct,

the

evidence

evidence was obtained

would

be

admissible.

Second,

if the

in a manner sufficiently distinguishable

from the prior illegality so that the evidence was purged of the
primary taint, the evidence would also be admissible.
In the context of a claimed voluntary consent to search,
the Tenth Circuit in Carson held that the "exploitation of the
primary illegality" meant that the law enforcement agents would
have used the fruits of the primary

- 7 -

illegality to coerce the

defendant into granting his consent.

The court in Carson noted

that normally the issue would be resolved by determining if the
grant

of consent

was voluntary.

However,

the manner of the

request to search may also render the consent involuntary.

After

discussing the standards used to determine if a consent to search
was voluntary, the court described the two critical factors that
supported its conclusion in that case.

First, the defendant was

not aware that the prior illegal search had even taken place.
Second, there was no use of the illegal search to coerce the
consent.

It is important to note that Carson did not involve any

claim of unlawful detention.

When any consent is derived during

an unlawful detention, the Tenth Circuit has reached a different
result.
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448
1985), the court noted that the

(10th Cir.

government bears a heavier burden

to show voluntariness of a consent after an illegal stop than it
would bear after a permissible stop.

The court held that in the

situation involving an illegal stop, the government must establish
a break in the causal connection between the detention and the
consent.

Likewise, the evidence must show that the consent was

sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.

- ft -

The court in Recalde cited Brown v. Illinois. 442 U.S. 590 (1975)
and Dunavav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), in holding that
three factors should be considered in determining if a consent was
tainted by a prior illegal detention or search.

Those factors

are: the temporal proximity of the consent to the illegal arrest
or detention; the presence of any intervening circumstances; and
the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.

The court in

Recalde found that the signing of the consent form took place
during the illegal detention and shortly after the officers should
have released the defendant.

Consequently, the search occurred

close in time to the Fourth Amendment violation.
With respect to the presence of intervening circumstances,
the Recalde court rejected the government's argument that reciting
the

Miranda

warning

to

a

detention of illegality.

detainee

would

purge

the

initial

The government also claimed that the

written consent to search form, which stated that the signer could
refuse

to

consent

circumstance.
evidence

to

the

search,

constituted

an

intervening

The court rejected that argument, noting that the

indicated

the

defendant

could

not

read

English,

Furthermore, the officers detained the defendant in a small room
without

returning

his driver's

license or the ticket

for the

In Brown, the Court rejected the argument that a confession
made after an illegal arrest was admissible because it was
voluntary in the Fifth Amendment sense.
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traffic violation that was the basis for the stop.

The court

concluded that the design and execution of the stop and arrest
reflected that its primary purpose was investigatory in nature.
It was obvious to the court that the officers had embarked on an
expedition for evidence in the hope that something would turn up.
Such circumstances made the violation particularly

flagrant in

nature.
Subsequent to the decision in United States v. Carson,
supra, the Tenth Circuit found that the stop of a vehicle for a
seat belt violation by the driver violated the Fourth Amendment as
it stop was a pretext,
(10th Cir. 1988).

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512

The district court in that case had failed to

make any findings with respect to the issue of the subsequent
consent to search the vehicle.

The case was remanded to the

district court so that the proper findings could be made, on the
issue of consent applying the factors discussed in Recalde, supra.
In doing

so, the court

noted

that

there would be

few cases

involving an illegal detention where the taint could be vitiated
by a voluntary consent.
From the foregoing discussion,
holdings

in

Sierra,

Arroyo

and

it

Aauilar

is obvious that the
are

based

on

a

misinterpretation of the case law from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
require

To be consistent
that,

in addition

with those
to

finding

- 10 -

cases this court must
a voluntary

consent

to

search,

there

must

also be

a finding

that

such

consent

was

sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal detention to purge
that illegality.

This may be done by analyzing the three factors

in Recalde, supra.

These are the factors that the Supreme Court

required to be analyzed

in determining

the admissibility

of a

voluntary confession after a Fourth Amendment violation in Brown
v, Illinois, supra.

Without employing such an analysis, the Utah

rule is insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests.
In United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir.
1980),

the

court

required

that

these

same

three

factors be

employed to determine if the illegal detention has been vitiated
by a subsequent voluntary consent.

In discussing the necessity of

such an analysis, the court related these factors to the policies
that

justify the Fourth Amendment's

exclusionary rule.

These

policies are deterrence of unlawful police activity and protection
of the integrity of the judicial system.
643 (1961).
factors

Mapp v, Ohio, 367 U.S.

The court in Perez-Esparza, supra, noted that the two

relating

to

the

temporal

proximity

and

intervening

circumstances between the unlawful detention and the voluntary
consent relate to the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule.
The

court

further

noted

that

flagrancy of the misconduct

an analysis

of

the purpose or

furthers the policy of protecting

judicial integrity.
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The result of the rulings in Sierra, Arroyo, and Aguilar
vitiates

these

policies

exclusionary rule.

that

underlie

the

Fourth

Amendment's

Law enforcement will be encouraged to violate

the Fourth Amendment by making illegal stops or conducting illegal
searches.
obtain

a

To undo the
voluntary

initial

consent.

illegality officers need only
The

deterrence

exclusionary rule will be rendered ineffective.

aspect

of

the

Furthermore, by

limiting the analysis of such Fourth Amendment violations to a
question of whether a consent was voluntarily given, the integrity
of the judicial process is demeaned.

Under the rulings in Sierra,

Arroyo and Aguilar, courts are forced to condone the most flagrant
and purposeful Fourth Amendment violations and address only the
issue of the voluntariness of the consent.

Furthermore, officers

will be encouraged to perjure themselves, by testifying that there
was voluntary consent.

In order that evidence seized from an

illegal stop may then be admissable.
When there has been an unlawful detention followed by a
voluntary

consent, the Fourth Amendment

analysis previously described.
is merely a threshold issue.

requires the two part

The voluntariness of the consent
An analysis of the attenuation of

the taint from the initial detention is also required.

A number

This may already be occuring, as there seems to be a large
number of cases decided by this court where a very questionable
detention is followed by a voluntary consent.
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of state courts and the majority of the federal circuit courts
have

employed

require

that

such
the

an

analysis.

government

bear

Additionally,
the burden

voluntary consent and the requisite attenuation.

of

these

courts

showing

both

United States v.

Guzman, supra. United State v. Perez-Esparza. supra. United States
v. Bazinet. 462 F.2d 982 (8th Cir.) cert, den. 409 U.S. 1010
(1972); United States v. Sanchez-Jarmillo. 637 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Cherry. 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Gooding. 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Miller. 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987); State v. Rasheem.
464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex.
Cr. App. 1987); People v. Borges. 69 N.Y. 2nd 1031, 511 N.E. 2d 58
(1987); People v. Odom 83 111. App. 3 d 1022, 404 N.E. 2d 997
(1980).
In analyzing the factors described in Brown v. Illinois.
supra, a number of circumstances arise in the case law that are
worth noting.

With respect to the temporal proximity of the

unlawful detention to the consent, the courts have generally held
that when the consent is closely related in time to the detention,
the taint of the detention remains.

United States v. Delgadillo-

Velasauez, 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Miller.
supra; United States v. Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Recalde. supra; C.f. Juarez v. State 708 S.W. 2d
772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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Intervening
release

from

circumstances

custody,

an

have

been

appearance

found

before

to

the

include

magistrate,

discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge,
United States v. Delqadillo, Velasquez, supra.

Other intervening

circumstances that may establish sufficient attenuation between
the

unlawful

described

detention

and

in the case law:

the

voluntary

consent

have

been

giving of the Miranda warning and

allowing the defendant to consult with a passenger, United States
v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983), Juarez v. State, supra,
telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the
search, Reyes v, State, supra, developing probable cause from
independent
Cherry,

sources to justify the detention United States v,

supra,

and

whether

the

consent

was

volunteered

or

requested, People v. Borqes, supra.
Circumstances relating to the purpose or flagrancy of the
violation

have

included:

the use of

firearms to effect the

arrest; People v. Odom, supra: a manner of arrest or detention
that

caused

confusion,

Delqadillo-Velasquez,
information

about

surprise

supra:

criminal

a

or

fright,

complete

activity

by

lack

United
of

States v.

suspicion

the defendant,

or

United

States v, Thompson, supra: State v. Zielman, 384 So. 2d 359 (La.
1980); the circumstances of the detention reflect that officers
were on an expedition to find evidence.

Reyes v. State, supra; or

the use of threats or physical force, United States v. Perez
Esparza, supra.
- 14 -

In the instant case, the purported consent occured during
the unlawful detention.

There were no intervening circumstances

between the detention and the consent.
the officers were purposeful

Finally, the actions of

and flagrant

in relation

to the

Fourth Amendment violation.
Appellant was stopped on Interstate 15 at a roadblock.
(Tr. 8)

The lack of legal authority to engage in such a procedure
7
was discussed in appellant's opening brief.
Likewise, troopers
o

had unlimited discretion in how the roadblock would be conducted.
The

fear

and

anxiety

created

by

such
g
discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief.

a

roadblock

was

also

After appellant was stopped, Trooper Howard requested that
appellant produce his driver's license and vehicle registration.
(Tr.

9)

The

registration

appellant's wife
Georgia.

(Tr. 9)

(Tr. 9)

indicated

the vehicle belonged

to

and the driver's license was from

The trooper confronted appellant about these

matters and also about the odor of alcohol that appellant had
about him.

(Tr. 10)

The trooper then asked appellant if he was

in possession of any alcohol, firearms or drugs.

Appellant then

See:

Opening Brief of Appellant, Point I.A. pp. 11-14.

See:

Opening Brief of Appellant, Point II, pp. 21-38.

See:

Opening Brief of Appellant,Point II, pp. 21-38.
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produced an open bottle of liquor,

(Tr. 10)

The trooper ordered

appellant out of the vehicle and requested his consent to search
the vehicle.

(Tr. 11)

Appellant acquiesced to that request.

(Tr. 11)
As

can

be

seen,

any

consent

intertwined with the unlawful detention.

given

was

inextricably

There was no substantial

passage of time to allow appellant to reflect on whether or not he
would grant his consent to search.

There were no intervening

circumstances that would eliminate the taint of the continuing
detention.

The stated purpose of the roadblock was to discover

evidence of criminal violations.

The procedures used did nothing

to dissipate fear or confusion on the part of appellant.

Finally,

the questioning during the detention took on an accusatory nature.
Appellant and the passenger were ordered out of the vehicle and
appellant merely acquiesced to the request to search his vehicle.
Any

consent

in

this

exploitation of the

case

was

obtained

as

a

result

initial unlawful detention.

of

the

The evidence

seized is the fruit of that initial detention and must be ordered
suppressed.
B.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRUITS OF A VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE
I,
SECTION
14
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION SHOULD FOCUS ON THE ATTENUATION
FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY RATHER THAN ON THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF ANY CONSENT.
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The Fourth Amendment
requires

that

when

an

to the United States Constitution

unlawful

detention

is

followed

by

a

purported voluntary consent, the government must not only show
that the consent was voluntary, but also that there was sufficient
attenuation between the consent and the detention to vitiate the
taint of the unlawful detention.
state

constitution

must

There is no question that a

provide

at

least

protection as the federal constitution.
provide

broader

protections

under

the

same

scope of

The state may, however,

its

constitution

required under the federal constitution.

than

are

State v. Brooks, 638

P.2d 537 (Ut. 1981).
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah should
require

that

a

finding

of

a

voluntary

consent

alone

insufficient to vitiate the effect of an illegal detention.

is
This

court should, at least, require under Article I, Section 14 that
any consent be sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful detention
to vitiate the taint of that detention.
the

Supreme

analysis
addressing

Court

of

Illinois

described

in

Brown

the

Illinois

v.

state

In People v. Odom, supra,

required

that

Illinois,

supra,

constitution

consent follows an unlawful detention

.

the

when

three part
be
a

used

in

voluntary

In People v. Borqes,

supra, the New York Court of Appeals addressed this same issue
See Point II.A., supra.
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under the New York State constitution.

In that case the court

held that voluntariness of the consent is only one factor for the
court to look at in determining if a search was tainted by an
initial illegal detention.

The court stated that consideration

must be given to a variety of factors.

Those factors include:

the temporal proximity of the consent to the arrestf the presence
or

absence

of

intervening

circumstances,

whether

the

police

purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain the consent or the
fruits of the arrest, whether the consent was volunteered by the
defendant or requested by the authorities, whether the defendant
was made aware that he could decline the consent, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
The

factors

that

the

New

York

court

required

to be

considered in dealing with this issue provide stronger protections
for privacy interests than does the rule in Brown v. Illinois,
supra.

Furthermore, the policy problems with the exclusionary

rule are avoided by making voluntary consent only a factor to
consider.

It is an analysis that should be adopted by this court

in addressing Article I, Section 14 violations.

When the facts

and circumstances of this case are weighed in light of the factors
described in People v. Borqes, supra this will result in the same
conclusion as was reached in Point II.A.

The purported consent

was closely related in time to the initial stop.

There were no

intervening circumstances between the detention and the consent.
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The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain evidence of criminal
violations.

The consent was given after appellant was removed

from his vehicle and after the officers requested to search the
vehicle.
The roadblock stop and detention of appellant violated
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

The seizure of

the cocaine was not sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal
detention

so

as to purge

the

taint of

that detention.

The

evidence seized must be ordered suppressed.
POINT III
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT
JUSTIFY
THE
SEARCH
OF
THE
TRUNK
OF
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
If this court
compartment

of

finds that

appellant's

initial detention,

it must

the search of the passenger

vehicle was

then determine

search of the trunk was permissible.
vehicle,

remnants

not

of marijuana

the

fruit

of the

if the warrantless

During the search of the

cigarettes were

ashtray in the rear seat area of the vehicle.

located

in an

(Tr. 13, 39, 51)

When Trooper Mangelson began to search the trunk of appellant's
vehicle, appellant

told him to quit searching.

(Tr. 41, 54)

Mangelson responded that the discovery of the marijuana gave him
probable cause to search the trunk.

(Tr. 42, 60)

At the time

that the vehicle was stopped, appellant was in the driver's seat.
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(Tr. 9)

The only passenger, Dorsey Thompson, was in the front

passenger seat.

(Tr. 10)

seat of the vehicle.
wife.

There were no occupants of the rear

The vehicle was registered to appellant's

(Tr. 9)
Respondent relies on State v.Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Ut. 1986)

and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S 798 (1982), to justify the
search of the trunk pursuant to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
supra, the defendant was stopped for weaving.

In State v. Earl,
When the highway

patrol trooper approached the vehicle he detected a strong odor of
marijuana.

The defendant

admitted

that

there were marijuana

cigarettes in a jacket in the passenger compartment.
the passenger compartment

resulted in the discovery of cocaine,

drug paraphernalia and air fresheners.
and the car impounded.

A search of

The defendant was arrested

When the officers were unable to locate a

judge to sign a warrant, an inventory search of the trunk was
conducted and thirty-three pounds of marijuana were discovered.
The court held that the initial search of the vehicle was proper
under the automobile exception.

The distinguishing factor in Earl

is that the search of the trunk was justified as a inventory
search.

There was no claim that an inventory search was made in

this case.
In United States v. Ross, supra, police officers received
information that the defendant was selling narcotics out of the
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trunk of his vehicle.
containers

in the

He was stopped.

trunk were

searched.

officers located narcotics and currency.
containers

The trunk and several
In those

containers

The court held that the

in the trunk could be searched under the automobile

exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
case, there
be

In this

was no information indicating that contraband would

located

in the trunk.

The question before this court is

whether there was probable cause to justify the search of the
trunk of the vehicle under the automobile exception.
Some courts have held that when a driver or passenger are
found in possession of controlled substances it is reasonable to
assume that more controlled substances might be hidden
trunk.

in the

In Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986),

drugs were located in the ashtray in the front seat and about
three thousand dollars in currency was also found in that same
area.

In Fleming v. State, 502, So.2d 327 (Miss. 1987), the

defendant's vehicle was stopped for speeding.
of marijuana
cigarettes

in the vehicle.

were

in

There was an odor

Four partially burned marijuana

the ashtray

located in the defendant's lap.

and seeds

and marijuana

were

In United States v. Loucks, 806

F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986), there was an odor of marijuana in the
vehicle and some marijuana was found in the passenger compartment.
The courts held in each of these cases that those circumstances
justified a search of the trunk.
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It is important to note that in all of these cases the
controlled substances were in the immediate control of the driver
or passenger, or the use of the substances in the vehicle was very
recent.

It could be reasonable under those circumstances to make

the inference that there may be more controlled substances in the
vehicle.

In this case the remnants of the marijuana cigarettes

were located in the rear seat ashtray.
that area of the car.

There were no occupants in

There was no such contraband in the ashtray

in the front seat of the vehicle.

The clear inference that can be

made is that the occupants were not in immediate possession of the
drugs or had not recently used drugs.
assume

under

these

circumstances

It is not reasonable to

that

there

would

contraband located in the trunk of the vehicle.

be

more

Consequently,

there was no probable cause to search the trunk of appellant's
vehicle.

The search of that area does not qualify under the

automobile
Amendment.

exception to the warrant

requirement of the Fourth

The contraband that was seized as a result of that

search must be ordered to be suppressed.
POINT IV
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK
OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
In
Zimmerman

State

v.

Hyqh,

711

P.2d

264

(Ut.

1985),

Justice

wrote a concurring opinion taking the position that
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah should do away
with

requirement

as

established in the case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment.

He

took

all

of

the

the

position

requirement

of

exceptions

that

to

the

Article

If

the

only

warrant

exceptions

Section

14

to

would

the

relate

warrant
to

the

protection of the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction
of

evidence

Zimmerman

or voluntary

cited

consent.

In that

opinion, Justice

the breadth of the automobile

exception

reason to simplify the rule on warrantless searches.

as a

Under such

an analysis, the search of the trunk of appellant's vehicle in
this case would be prohibited under Article Ir Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
In Hyqh, Justice Zimmerman also urged the rejection of the
exclusionary rule as the remedy for a violation of Article If
Section 14. However, it does not appear that any other remedy has
adequately furthered the two policies underlying the exclusionary
rule:

deterrence

of

police

from

committing

constitutional

violations and protection of the integrity of our judicial system.
Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of the search of the
trunk of appellant's vehicle must be ordered to be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The stop and continued detention of appellant violated
both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
_ 07 -

The taint of

the stop and detention was not vitiated to the extent that the
fruits of the detention would be admissible as evidence against
appellant.

The

evidence

seized

must

be

ordered

suppressed.

Appellant's judgment and conviction must be reversed.
must be remanded to the
DATED this

The case

district court for a new trial.
day of February, 1990.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was MAILED/DELIVERED to the Attorney General's office,
at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on
this

day of February, 1990.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB, COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff.
vs.

Case Number, 151-D

LOUIS SIMS,

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

Defendant.
•*•***••

This matter came before the Court on the 31st day of
January, 1989 in Juab County, State of Utah, on the Motion of the
Defendant to Suppress Evidence secured pursuant to the search of
a vehicle he was driving when stopped at a road block in Juab
County at approximately mile post 220. The State of Utah was
represented by the Juab County Attorney, Donald Eyre, and the
defendant by his counsel, G. Fred Metos.

From the evidence

presented the Court makes the following findings:
1.

Peace Officers representing the Juab County

Sheriff's Office and the Utah Highway Patrol planned and executed
a road block on July 27, 1988 al approximately 2 miles south of
Nephi, on the north bound portion of Interstate 15.

Prior notice

of the road block was given through media publication to the
effect that all motor vehicles except semi-trucks would be

stopped for drivers licenses, vehicle registration, and
mechanical checks, commencing at 7:00 a.m.

Ten to twelve

officers participated at the site of the blockade where proper
advanced signing was given to approaching vehicles.
Participating law enforcement officers were in uniform and with
patrol cars present.
Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol conducted
a briefing prior to the road block of those participating wherein
inquiry was first to be made of drivers licenses, and automobile
registration, and that observations of the vehicles for equipment
or alcohol violations including driving under the influence, and
also for controlled substance violation.

If no violations were

apparent the vehicles were to be immediately released for
continuation of travel.

Citations or arrests were to be made for

violations detected at the stop.
The defendant, Louis E. Sims, vehicle was stopped at
the road block at approximately 9:00 a.m.

A trooper asked him

for his registration and drivers license which were produced.
The automobile was registered in Utah and the driver, Mr. Sims,
had a Georgia drivers license.

The officer delected a odor of

alcohol, and observed an open container of alcohol in the rear of
the car.

The defendant denied the presence oT weapons or

contraband, but admitted the presence of alcohol in the vehicle.
Upon request of the officer consent was obtained for the search

of the vehicle.

Sergearnt Mangelson assisted the trooper, Carl

Howard, in the search.

In addition to the open container of

alcohol the search of the backseat revealed two marijuana joints
in the back right hand side ashtray.

The defendant voluntarily

opened the trunk and Howard conducted a field sobriety test of
him.

Mangelson search the trunk and after discovery of

additional marijuana the defendant exhibited nervousness and
asked the officer to stop the search.

Mangelson continued the

search and in the tire compartment found a one kilogram brick of
cocaine.
Arrest was made of the defendant for driving under the
influence and for controlled substance violations.
Based on the foregoing findings of the court the first
issue to be resolved is whether the road block stop of the
defendant was a reasonable seizure, and not in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment Constitutional Rights.
The only pertinent Utah authority in this area is the
case of State of Utah v. Timothy Jo, case number 870537-CA, Utah
Court of Appeals filed September 20, 1988.

In that case a

Sergeant Rudy Cook established a road block in San Juan County
near Mexican Hat, approximately 100 feet from the entrance to the
Navajo Indian Reservation in the early morning hours of March 29,
1986.

Cook received no prior authorizalion from the sheriff's

office nor did he receive any call back after having called in

the road block that the operation was not authorized and he
therefore proceeded.
The road block was so located that there was
surrounding light from commercial buildings and a street light
together with police vehicles parked on both sides of the highway
with flashing red spot lights activated as vehicles approached,
these lights could be seen for two tenths of a mile.

There were

two officers and a civilian assisting Sergeant Cook who advised
those assisting him to "check everyone as they come for regular
traffic inspection, proper registration, proper drivers license,
check for intoxicated people, open containers."
The Court of Appeals cited Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), where the United Supreme Court held that a violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution occurs when
police detain a motorist to check drivers license and
registration without..."articulable and reasonable suspicion the
motorist is unlicensed, the automobile is not registered, or that
the vehicle or occupant may be seized for a violation of law."
In a dicta the Supreme Court stated that the above
holding does not deter a state..."from developing methods for
spot checks that involve Jess intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstitutional exercise of discretion

Questioning of all

oncoming traffic at road block-type stops is one possible
alternative."

The Court thus limited the decision to..."only

that persons in automobiles on public highways may not for that
reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers."
The facts in Timothy Jo were uncontroverted that two
vehicles immediately preceding the defendant were allowed

to

pass through the blockade without being detained, and therefore
that such unbridled discretion was volative of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure.
Since the Prouse case the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in the case of United States of America
vs. Gregory McFadden, was presented the same issue as is before
this Court.

Citing the Prouse case for the concept that stopping

an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even
though the stop is limited and resulting detention quite brief.
The Court in McFadden emphasized that "such seizures are
unconstitutional, however, only if they are unreasonable."

The

Court went on to say that "in determining the reasonableness of a
seizure a Court must balance the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty."

The Court went on to

say that..."a seizure

must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that
societies legitimate interests require the seizure of the

particular individual or..."the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers,"
The Court in McFadden also cited United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, (1976), where the Supreme Court
upheld the stopping of motor vehicles on a highway near Mexico
for brief questions to determine whether illegal aliens were
present.

Noting that the check point where all vehicles were

stopped was permanent and the degree of detention consistent with
the Forth Amendment and did not require a warrant.

The regular

manner in which established check points are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law abiding motorists that the stops are
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. Other
authorities were cited wherein

automobile road blocks held in a

clearly visible check point where all vehicles were inspected for
legal aliens, drivers license, vehicle registration, and proof of
insurance, where the road block was "established in a systematic
manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected the public
from the officers unbridled discretion,..."past constitutional
muster."

The Court pointing out that a single officer stopping a

car along a road to check drivers licenses, and registration
because of suspicious conduct of watching officers through the
rear view mirror, that such a search was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.

The Court stating that "a roving police stop

is a more serious intrusion than a predicted check point
inspection, because the unexpected stop is pregnant with great
annoyance and inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or
embarrass,"
In sustaining the road block imposed the McFadden case
the Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the road block was
to regulate vehicular traffic by allowing the check of drivers
license and vehicle registrations.

And that the side effect of

deterring drug sellers trafficking in areas where the road block
was posted did not render the blockade unlawful.
The fact that a history of escalating drug traffic
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a result of other arrests,
tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers to minimize the burden
to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random
roving stops.
The Court concludes that the road block in question in
this case was so planned and so executed as to render the
inconvenience to the traveling public to be minimal, and so
structured to neutralize the officers conducting the road block
to a minimal intrusion on the traveling public's time and
inconvenience.
As to the conduct of the police officers after having
affected a lawful stop the Court concludes that it became readily

apparent to the officers senses that the defendant had been
drinking, and as a result of that and of sobriety tests given
him, he was charged with driving under the influence.

Also, the

officer noted an open alcohol container in the vehicle and
obtained the consent from the driver to search the backseat wher
he found two marijuana roaches in the right rear cigarette tray,
and asked the driver to open the trunk which he did.

There is

no evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary
character of the consent given to the search of the car,
including the trunk where marijuana was found.

Thereafter the

defendant withdrew his consent to continue the search, but the
officer proceeded and found a kilo of cocaine in the spare tire
well.

The presence of the marijuana in the trunk compartment

gave the officer reasonable cause to believe that additional
contraband was probably present in the accessible areas of the
trunk and which legitimized his search into the tire well where
the cocaine was found.
The Court concludes that all of the actions of the
officers was legal and lawful and that the contraband obtained
admissible evidence in prosecutions for controlled substance
violations and other violations detected and charged and a resu
of this stop.

The Motion of the Defendant to Suppress the Evidence in
this case is therefore denied.

This matter is set for jury trial

on the 28th day of March, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. in
Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah.
Dated this *- ^day of February, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE CJ BALLIF, JUDGE/
cc:

counsel

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH,

Case Number 151-D

Plaintiff.
vs.
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

Defendant.
********

On or about the 24th day of February, 1989 this Court
entered its ruling denying the motion of defendant to suppress
evidence in this case claiming the same to have been secured as
the result of an unlawful seizure of the defendant in violation
of his constitutional rights.
Defendant has moved the Court to reconsider its
ruling..."for the reason that the Court failed to addressed the
issue of the constitutionality of the stop oE defendant's vehicle
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah."
The Court has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the
Tlefendant, and finds that it did not fail to consider the issue
as to the broader protection afforded under the Utah Constitution
to the personal rights protected by the Utah Constitution as
opposed to Article 4 of the Federal. Constitution and the
application of federal law in the area of search and seizure.
The Court refers counsel to the findings made by the
Court with reference to the road block, the m.it U-T in which it
was constituted, the notice given the pubLLc as to its operation
on a given day, the reasonableness of the detention provided and

the limitation on discretion of an officer to pick and choose
amongst the traveling public as to who would be stopped and who
allowed to past.
The Timothy Joe case is factually distinguishable from
the case of the United State of America vs. McFadden, and
although there seems to be no other Utah case than Timothy Joe
which has addressed the road block issue, McFadden, would seem to
be within the scope of police activity which would be found not
to violate Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, and
that the activities of the police in the case before the Court
would be consistent with McFadden and found by the courts of this
state not to constitute an unreasonable seizure of a defendant
and incriminating evidence of a violation of law.
The Court therefore again affirms its ruling as
announced in the Ruling dated February 24, 1989 which denies the
defendant's motion to suppress in this case.
Dated this

day of April, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE
cc:

Donald Eyre
Fred Metos

